Skip to content

Emergency And Pause Flow

flowchart TD
    A[Alert] --> B{Classify incident}
    B -->|queued malicious upgrade| C[cancelUpgrade]
    B -->|role/key compromise| D[revokeRole or cancel pending grant]
    B -->|vault/validator risk| E[pause executors, update risk, request exit]
    B -->|claim safety issue| F[setClaimExecutorsPaused or clear reserve readiness]
    B -->|beacon end-state emergency| G[finalFreeze registered beacons]
    C --> H[Verify state and archive evidence]
    D --> H
    E --> H
    F --> H
    G --> H

Emergency Levers

Lever Authority Use
cancelUpgrade CANCELLER_ROLE Stop a proposed/queued operation before execution.
revokeRole roleAdmin Remove compromised role holder immediately and clear pending grants.
cancelRoleGrant roleAdmin Cancel staged grants during the delay window.
setClaimExecutorsPaused Controller owner through gatekeeper Disable executor-assisted claims while keeping direct beneficiary paths subject to controller logic.
setTriggerArmed(false) Controller owner Disable running claims for a vault and cancel pending claim if any.
clearReserveCoverage Controller owner Remove reserve readiness when proof or custody is invalid.
requestValidatorExit* Public caller through controller checks Initiate validator exit under controller policy.
proposeSettlementWithGuard Controller owner Move a vault toward settlement, emergency or ordinary.
finalFreeze FREEZER_ROLE Irreversibly freeze registered vault beacons.

Fail-Closed Conditions

Claims and deposits should fail closed when observations are stale, risk is quarantined, reserve proof is stale, exit is in progress, policy assertions fail, router bootstrap is open, beacon authority drifts, or a governance role signal is unexplained.

Incident Evidence

Archive alert source, on-chain event ids, decoded calldata, signer set, cancellation or mitigation transaction, post-action reads, affected vaults, user communications, and the follow-up remediation issue.

Layered Response Rule

Emergency response should use the narrowest lever that matches the failing layer. Upgrade governance incidents use cancellation, role revocation, registration review, or final-freeze only for beacon end-state emergencies. Deposit permissioning incidents use intent removal or allowlist-admin rotation. Custody/readiness incidents use factory, controller, vault, router, reserve, or exit-route evidence before reopening deposits. Economic/claim safety incidents use claim pause, trigger changes, reserve coverage clearing, risk updates, exit requests, or settlement procedures. Crossing layers without documenting why creates avoidable authority risk.