Cancel Upgrade¶

Purpose¶

Stop a proposed or queued operation before it can execute.

Required Authority¶

CANCELLER_ROLE.

When To Use¶

Unknown or malicious operation.
Metadata, code hash, calldata, or target mismatch.
New vulnerability discovered during timelock.
Signer compromise suspected.
Release owner withdraws approval.

Procedure¶

Decode the operation and identify the exact reason for cancellation.
Notify roleAdmin, upgrade operations, release owner, and incident lead.
Confirm operation is not already executed or cancelled.
Call cancelUpgrade(operationId).
Verify UpgradeCancelled and getOperation(operationId).cancelled == true.
Open follow-up remediation or replacement upgrade issue.

Abort Conditions¶

Do not cancel a legitimate emergency fix without explicit incident-lead approval unless the operation itself is unsafe.

Evidence To Archive¶

Alert, decoded payload, cancellation rationale, tx hash, UpgradeCancelled, post-state read, and communications timeline.

Operational Procedure¶

Purpose¶

Use this runbook to stop a proposed or queued operation before it can execute.

When To Use¶

Use it for production, staging, or rehearsal actions that affect live authority, validator custody, economic accounting, claims, or incident response. Do not use it as a substitute for source review; deployed-state evidence remains Evidence required unless captured for the exact chain and address set.

Required Authority¶

Required authority: CANCELLER_ROLE. Read-only preparation can be performed by an operator or auditor, but transaction submission must come from the documented production holder in the permission matrix.

Preconditions¶

The current source manifest and generated inventory are up to date.
The acting Safe or owner has been verified against the current permission matrix.
No unresolved incident is active for the same contract, validator, role, or operation.
The reviewer can identify which layer is affected: Upgrade governance, Deposit permissioning, Custody/readiness, or Economic/claim safety.

Inputs Required¶

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Step-By-Step Procedure¶

read operation status.
capture suspicious evidence.
submit cancelUpgrade.
notify signers and operators.
open remediation ticket.

Independent Review Requirement¶

A second reviewer must check the decoded calldata, expected state transition, affected role or validator, and expected events before submission. For emergency use, capture the reviewer identity and incident ticket before or immediately after the transaction.

Abort Conditions¶

Source manifest hash drift or unexpected implementation metadata.
Caller or Safe does not match the permission matrix.
Revert reason points at a different layer than the runbook is trying to change.
Any required input is missing or only inferred.
A guardian, canceller, or incident commander has frozen the action window.

On-Chain Pre-Checks¶

Read current role/owner/admin state, operation status, target code hash where applicable, validator/vault mapping where applicable, and the latest readiness or claim state that the action depends on. Record block number and RPC endpoint.

On-Chain Post-Checks¶

Confirm the intended state changed, no adjacent authority changed unexpectedly, and no pending operation or stale intent was left active. Re-read the affected contract rather than relying only on transaction success.

Events Or Logs To Monitor¶

UpgradeCancelled.

Evidence To Archive¶

Archive calldata, transaction hash, decoded event logs, pre/post reads, reviewer approval, incident or change ticket, and any source-manifest or release-artifact references used to justify the action.

Escalation Path¶

Escalate to governance signers for authority or upgrade anomalies, to controller/risk owners for economic or claim anomalies, to admission operators for intent mistakes, and to security incident response for unexpected code, role, or event drift.