Queue Upgrade¶

Purpose¶

Start the governor timelock for a proposed operation.

Required Authority¶

QUEUER_ROLE.

Preconditions¶

• Proposal exists and is not cancelled or executed.
• Independent proposal review is complete.
• Guardian/Canceller Safe is available for the full delay window.
• Deposit and claim windows are scheduled around the possible execution.

Procedure¶

1. Read getOperation(operationId).
2. Recompute the operation id from stored fields.
3. Verify release approval and proposer evidence.
4. Call queueUpgrade(operationId).
5. Record queuedAt and readyAt from UpgradeQueued.
6. Start monitoring cadence: immediate review, 24-hour pre-ready review, final pre-execute review.

On-Chain Checks Before Execution Window¶

• Implementation code hash still matches.
• Target remains registered under expected kind.
• No unexpected role-admin, role-grant, registrar, or final-freeze event occurred.
• readyAt has not been reached before review signoff.

Abort Conditions¶

Cancel if any metadata, target, calldata, signer, or external vulnerability signal changes before execution.

Evidence To Archive¶

Queue tx, UpgradeQueued, readyAt, monitoring owner, review timestamps, and cancellation readiness confirmation.

Operational Procedure¶

Purpose¶

Use this runbook to start the governance delay for an already proposed operation.

When To Use¶

Use it for production, staging, or rehearsal actions that affect live authority, validator custody, economic accounting, claims, or incident response. Do not use it as a substitute for source review; deployed-state evidence remains Evidence required unless captured for the exact chain and address set.

Required Authority¶

Required authority: QUEUER_ROLE. Read-only preparation can be performed by an operator or auditor, but transaction submission must come from the documented production holder in the permission matrix.

Preconditions¶

• The current source manifest and generated inventory are up to date.
• The acting Safe or owner has been verified against the current permission matrix.
• No unresolved incident is active for the same contract, validator, role, or operation.
• The reviewer can identify which layer is affected: Upgrade governance, Deposit permissioning, Custody/readiness, or Economic/claim safety.

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Step-By-Step Procedure¶

1. read proposed operation.
2. confirm no cancellation criteria are active.
3. submit queueUpgrade.
4. record readyAt.
5. start monitoring window.

Independent Review Requirement¶

A second reviewer must check the decoded calldata, expected state transition, affected role or validator, and expected events before submission. For emergency use, capture the reviewer identity and incident ticket before or immediately after the transaction.

Abort Conditions¶

• Source manifest hash drift or unexpected implementation metadata.
• Caller or Safe does not match the permission matrix.
• Revert reason points at a different layer than the runbook is trying to change.
• Any required input is missing or only inferred.
• A guardian, canceller, or incident commander has frozen the action window.

On-Chain Pre-Checks¶

Read current role/owner/admin state, operation status, target code hash where applicable, validator/vault mapping where applicable, and the latest readiness or claim state that the action depends on. Record block number and RPC endpoint.

On-Chain Post-Checks¶

Confirm the intended state changed, no adjacent authority changed unexpectedly, and no pending operation or stale intent was left active. Re-read the affected contract rather than relying only on transaction success.

Events Or Logs To Monitor¶

• UpgradeQueued.

Evidence To Archive¶

Archive calldata, transaction hash, decoded event logs, pre/post reads, reviewer approval, incident or change ticket, and any source-manifest or release-artifact references used to justify the action.

Escalation Path¶

Escalate to governance signers for authority or upgrade anomalies, to controller/risk owners for economic or claim anomalies, to admission operators for intent mistakes, and to security incident response for unexpected code, role, or event drift.