Suspicious Governance Action¶

Purpose¶

Respond to unexpected governance, registrar, role, or final-freeze activity.

Procedure¶

Capture event, transaction, sender, decoded calldata, and affected target.
Compare against approved governance tickets.
If unknown, notify guardian, roleAdmin, release owner, and incident lead.
For upgrade operations, prepare cancelUpgrade.
For role grants, prepare cancelRoleGrant or revokeRole.
For role-admin transfer, prepare cancelRoleAdminTransfer if current roleAdmin is safe.
Pause sensitive deposit/claim windows until classification is complete.
Preserve all logs and signer communications.

Abort Conditions¶

Do not execute normal upgrades, deposits, registrar actions, or role rotations while the suspicious action is unresolved.

Post-Checks¶

Suspicious operation cancelled or classified as approved.
Affected roles and target registrations read back.
Monitoring alert is closed with evidence.
Follow-up root-cause issue opened.

Evidence To Archive¶

Event logs, decoded payload, approval-ticket comparison, decision record, mitigation tx, post-state reads, and incident timeline.

Operational Procedure¶

Purpose¶

Use this runbook to triage a governance event that does not match an approved ticket or source snapshot.

When To Use¶

Use it for production, staging, or rehearsal actions that affect live authority, validator custody, economic accounting, claims, or incident response. Do not use it as a substitute for source review; deployed-state evidence remains Evidence required unless captured for the exact chain and address set.

Required Authority¶

Required authority: read-only triage plus guardian authority if cancellation is required. Read-only preparation can be performed by an operator or auditor, but transaction submission must come from the documented production holder in the permission matrix.

Preconditions¶

The current source manifest and generated inventory are up to date.
The acting Safe or owner has been verified against the current permission matrix.
No unresolved incident is active for the same contract, validator, role, or operation.
The reviewer can identify which layer is affected: Upgrade governance, Deposit permissioning, Custody/readiness, or Economic/claim safety.

Inputs Required¶

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Step-By-Step Procedure¶

freeze routine operations.
decode the action.
compare to source manifest and release ticket.
recommend cancel or proceed.
escalate if final-freeze or role compromise is possible.

Independent Review Requirement¶

A second reviewer must check the decoded calldata, expected state transition, affected role or validator, and expected events before submission. For emergency use, capture the reviewer identity and incident ticket before or immediately after the transaction.

Abort Conditions¶

Source manifest hash drift or unexpected implementation metadata.
Caller or Safe does not match the permission matrix.
Revert reason points at a different layer than the runbook is trying to change.
Any required input is missing or only inferred.
A guardian, canceller, or incident commander has frozen the action window.

On-Chain Pre-Checks¶

Read current role/owner/admin state, operation status, target code hash where applicable, validator/vault mapping where applicable, and the latest readiness or claim state that the action depends on. Record block number and RPC endpoint.

On-Chain Post-Checks¶

Confirm the intended state changed, no adjacent authority changed unexpectedly, and no pending operation or stale intent was left active. Re-read the affected contract rather than relying only on transaction success.

Events Or Logs To Monitor¶

RoleGranted.
UpgradeProposed.
UpgradeQueued.
FinalFreeze.

Evidence To Archive¶

Archive calldata, transaction hash, decoded event logs, pre/post reads, reviewer approval, incident or change ticket, and any source-manifest or release-artifact references used to justify the action.

Escalation Path¶

Escalate to governance signers for authority or upgrade anomalies, to controller/risk owners for economic or claim anomalies, to admission operators for intent mistakes, and to security incident response for unexpected code, role, or event drift.